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The main finding of this article is that sustainability and the broader concept of social 
responsibility imply a change in the spirit of governance, which promotes the so-called 'de facto 
convergence' between the different corporate governance systems existing all over the world. 
Substantial corporate governance convergence suggests that different countries may have 
different companies' ownership structure, rules and institutions but the corporate boards may 
still be able to perform common goals, with attention to similar key performance indicators, 
such as ensuring fair disclosure or accountability. Companies that perform better with regard to 
the triple bottom line can increase shareholder value contributing, at the same time, to the 
sustainable development of the societies in which they operate. 
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One of the most striking difference between 
countries’ corporate governance systems is about 
the firms’ ownership and control (OECD, 1999). 
According to the degree of ownership and control, 
corporate governance systems can be distinguished 
in outsider systems (characterised by wide dispersed 
ownership) and insider systems (characterised by 
concentrated ownership). 
All over the world, shareholders have always 
had a significant role in the attribution of the 
mandate of corporate governance. In fact, the 
general shareholder meeting is often the only body 
responsible for the election and the removal of 
board members. Even with worker participation (as 
in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg and 
Sweden, where employees of companies of a certain 
size have the right to elect some members of the 
supervisory board), it generally tends to intervene 
significantly in the conferment of the mandate of 
governance bodies. This has contributed to the 
affirmation of the shareholder view, which has long 
dominated the orientation of corporate governance 
emphasising the shareholders’ interests and the 
economic performance. 
In the past, the choices of corporate 
governance have therefore favoured profit 
maximisation (Berle and Means, 1932; Friedman, 
1962; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), with a clear focus 
on the consent by shareholders. Such behaviour was 
particularly evident in outsider systems, but 
dominated the majority of companies in 
industrialised countries. 
In fact, for listed companies, a governance 
approach oriented to shareholders implied 
important differences about management activities 
in outsider and insider systems. This situation was 
connected to the diverse degree of separation 
between ownership and management and to the 
consequent implications in terms of market and 
control value.  
In the outsider systems, the high dispersion of 
share capital tied the corporate success with the 
maximization of the short-term profit, with the aim 
to guarantee positive judgments by the market in 
regard to the actions of managers, these last 
characterized by a high level of independence. In 
this context, shareholders appreciated the 
governance effectiveness referring to their 
expectations of short-term remuneration and their 
approval conditioned the board members’ 
appointment and the shares’ market value. 
Vice versa, in the insider systems the high 
capital’s concentration and the frequent engagement 
in management by majority shareholders, who was 
often executives directors, caused governance 
activity oriented to the maximization of the value 
creation over time. In fact, the majority 
shareholders’ behaviour deeply influenced corporate 
governance because of their lasting participation in 
ownership determined the preponderance of goals 
oriented to the maximization of economic 
performance in the long-term (OECD, 1999; Salvioni 
and Gennari, 2014). 
Governance practices vary not only across 
countries but also across firms and their spirit of 
governance. Today, boards are expected to accept 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
sustainability as business drivers shifting their 
attention from profit to the “triple bottom line” 
(Salvioni, 2003; King, 2008; McDonnell  and King, 
2013; Salvioni and Astori, 2013; Salvioni, Astori and 
Cassano, 2014), which encompasses profit, people 
and planet. It is an approach based on a modern 
interpretation of the links between the long-term 
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success of enterprise and the equitable balance of all 
stakeholders’ interests (including those of 
shareholders, employees, creditors, customers, 
suppliers and local communities). We think this 
approach is intended to apply to whatever company 
ownership and board structure, helping to 
effectively reduce the differences between outsider 
and insider systems of corporate governance. 
The latest arise of new concepts referring to 
sustainability, social responsibility and stakeholder 
relation management (Steurer et al., 2005; Salvioni 
and Astori 2013) is inducing a new approach about 
the role of companies in society, with clear 
consequences in terms of strategic guidance and 
performance.  
Corporate sustainability does not mean that the 
creation of value and the adequate remuneration for 
shareholders are less important; vice versa, the 
interdependence among stakeholder relation 
management, economic and socio-environmental 
responsibility, results (economic and not economic 
ones), capability to obtain consents and resources is 
opportunely emphasized. 
A governance approach directed to the 
enhancement of value creation for shareholders over 
time, by means of opportunities’ exploitation and 
economic, social and environmental risk 
management, is gaining ground (Esty and Winston 
2008; Brochet et al., 2012; Salvioni and Astori 2013). 
A sustainable company is clearly aware of its 
own responsibilities towards shareholders and other 
stakeholders and it adopts governance methods and 
tools with the aim to improve its economic, social 
and ecological performances. This is an approach 
based on a wide concept of responsibility and on a 
modern interpretation of the link between the long-
lasting company’s success and fair settlement of all 
stakeholders’ interests (Salvioni 2003; Salvioni and 
Bosetti 2006; G20/OECD 2015). 
In global markets the need of corporate 
governance improvement is spreading, according to 
these objectives:  
- to favour the convergence in governance 
systems for dealing with the fall of time and space 
barriers in the information and capital circulation;  
- to appreciate the links among economic, 
competitive and socio-environmental management 
variables;  
- to develop strategies and accountability tools 
with the aim to favour stakeholder engagement and 
to improve the transparency about global 
performances.  
These are phenomena strictly connected, 
implying a greater attention towards principles and 
values that lead internal and external relations and 
innovation in processes for a systematic, 
coordinated, effective and efficient sustainable 
development. 
In particular, the statement and the diffusion 
of responsible governance principles favour a global 
convergence in the governance tendencies towards 
value creation and growth in the long-term. This 
condition removes a substantial divergence factor 
between insider and outsider corporate governance 
systems and it represents a prerequisite for a better 
capitals’ circulation and for the crossing of 
speculative investment logics, which are often 
characterized by a high shareholders’ turnover. 
CSR and sustainability require good corporate 
governance, grounded on stakeholder engagement, 
high ethical standards, fairness, transparency and 
accountability. All these principles are related with 
boards more externally focused and determine a 
governance approach directed to the growth of 
sustainable value over time.  Worldwide this focus 
by boards has increasingly shifted to excellence 
every corporate governance systems.   
The main finding of this paper is that 
sustainability and the broader concept of social 
responsibility imply a change in the spirit of 
governance, which promotes the so-called de facto 
convergence between the different systems of 
corporate governance existing all over the word. 
This spirit is inextricably linked to the culture and 
performance of an organisation, and it implies a 
stronger focus on the principles and values that 
dominate internal and external relations, the 
innovation of the internal processes for the 
behavioural orientation and the enhancement of 
transparency requirements and multidimensionality 
of responsibilities, objectives and results.  
In this sense, the orientation towards 
sustainability promotes the substantial convergence 
of the different systems of corporate governance. 
Substantial corporate governance convergence 
suggests that different countries may have different 
ownership structure of the companies, rules and 
institutions but the corporate boards may still be 
able to perform the same functions, with attention 
to the same key performances indicators such as 
ensuring fair disclosure or accountability.  
 
2. SUSTAINABILITY, OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 
 
Sustainability is a long-term vision that characterizes 
the socially responsible companies (Carroll, 1999; 
Dahlsrud, 2008; European Commission 2011). In 
fact, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), basing on 
a concept of global corporate responsibility referred 
to all governance dimensions (legal, economic, social 
and environmental), is oriented to the maximisation 
of value for all relevant stakeholders in the long-
term. This approach implies the balance of the 
interests of all who contribute to the current and 
future company’s success by means of a sustainable 
value creation that satisfies both the shareholder 
and other stakeholder (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
Socially irresponsible companies are subject to legal 
sanctions and other punishments; this situation 
compromises not only the economic aspects, but 
also the companies’ reputation and image and, 
consequently, the stock market value and the 
attractiveness for future investors.     
In turn, the link between CSR and corporate 
governance has been extensively studied: well-
designed corporate governance systems would align 
managers' incentives with those of stakeholders, 
according with the triple bottom line approach 
(Elkington, 2006). Hence, firms with effective 
corporate governance should place a greater 
emphasis on the maximization of sustainable value 
in the long-term (Jo and Harjoto, 2012).  
Several studies investigate the possible links 
between corporate governance structure and CSR 
decisions (Oh et al., 2011); this firstly depends on 
the way owners can affect corporate decision-
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making processes nominating the members of the 
board of directors, according to agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
In fact, the board is the focal point for a company’s 
sustainable approach considering that the awareness 
of sustainability’s principles and the adoption of 
responsible behaviours towards stakeholders tend to 
influence the corporate governance activities. In this 
context: 'The board is not only accountable to the 
company and its shareholders but also has a duty to 
act in their best interests. In addition, boards are 
expected to take due regard of, and deal fairly with, 
other stakeholder interests including those of 
employees, creditors, customers, suppliers and local 
communities. Observance of environmental and 
social standards is relevant in this context.’ 
(G20/OECD, 2015). 
Hence, the differences in companies’ ownership 
structure should have a significant impact on 
corporate governance by means of the appointment 
of board of directors and the control procedures on 
management activity.  
Concentrated and stable ownership 
characterizes insider systems of corporate 
governance. The majority shareholders (not rarely 
corresponding to founder families) are involved in 
the management, often holding the role of executive 
directors, and they are able to influence corporate 
governance and decision-making processes. This 
situation is caused by the less development of 
financial markets, together with a cultural heritage 
little inclined towards both the opening of corporate 
capital to market and the presence of outside 
directors in the boards. Furthermore, this 
circumstance implies the risk of the preponderance 
of major shareholders’ interests if rules and tools 
for minority shareholders’ protection are not 
provided. In insider systems (notably Continental 
Europe and Japan) the mandate of corporate 
governance is generally multiyear (Salvioni, 2008; 
Yermack, 2010) and this situation favours the 
longer-term investment horizon (James, 1999; 
Salvioni and Gennari, 2014).  
Vice versa, in outsider systems, typical of 
Anglo-Saxon countries, large listed companies with 
very fragmented and diffused ownership (public 
companies) and characterized by the separation 
between ownership and management dominate. 
When the capital markets function efficiently, 
thanks to fair and transparent communications, the 
markets themselves control the administrative 
activity of companies. In fact, the approval or 
disapproval for the work of boards is reflected in a 
change in share values, resulting from the dynamics 
of shares’ demand and supply, and in the turnover 
of board members (who typically have a one-year 
mandate). In the outsider systems, the high 
dispersion of share capital risks to tie the corporate 
success with the maximization of the short-term 
profit. A sprinkled shareholding tends to have 
expectations of short-term remuneration, 
conditioning the board members’ appointment and 
the shares’ market value. 
So, the real point for the development and 
realization of a CSR approach is the board of 
directors, as expression of the ownership structure. 
In fact, the board defines and implements corporate 
strategy balancing the interests of key stakeholders 
(Mason and Simmons, 2014; Wang and Dewhirst, 
1992; OECD, 2004; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007). 
Furthermore, the board’s commitment in CSR 
matters is crucial for the creation of a sustainability 
culture in the entire organization. Evidence suggests 
that what really influences company’s approach 
towards CSR matters is not the criteria in the 
board’s composition (e.g. inside or outside 
managers) but the substantial commitment of the 
board in the sustainability principles (Ricart et al., 
2005; Spitzeck, 2009; Ayuso and Argandona, 2009; 
Jo and Harjoto, 2015). 
Therefore, sustainable companies’ boards, 
because of the combined consideration of economic 
and socio-environmental dimensions in corporate 
goals definition, tend to overtake the traditional 
division related to the differences in ownership 
structure drawing towards a gradual convergence 
between outsider and insider corporate governance 
systems. 
 
3. SUSTAINABILITY AND CONVERGENCE IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 
 
Corporate approach towards the creation of 
sustainable value is a source of global competitive 
advantage nurturing a gradual path of convergence 
in corporate governance systems. According to 
several scholars (Carati and Tournai, 2000; La Porta 
et al., 2000; Mallin, 2002; Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003; Gilson, 2004; Khanna et al., 2006; Yoshikawa 
and Rasheed, 2009; Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2010) 
this path mainly depends on the globalisation 
phenomena, both in the financial and products 
markets, and it can be observed according to these 
dimensions:  convergence in form or de jure and 
convergence in function or de facto.  
Convergence in form or de jure refers to 
convergence of rules at international level. In fact, 
the growing wish of both investors and issuers to 
operate in international capital markets requires 
some degree of acceptance of common values and 
standards (e.g. OECD Principles on Corporate 
Governance, UN Global Compact Principles, EU 
Papers). These shared and market-driven standards 
about good governance condition, on one hand, 
national legislators and, on the other hand, the 
practices voluntary adopted by companies to 
adequately compete on global markets.  
In addition, the globalization of products 
markets influence corporate governance: when 
competition intensifies, companies increase 
awareness that more effective and efficient 
governance is essential to maintain success. This 
might include the way stakeholders interact with the 
firm and connected stakeholders’ engagement, the 
balance between the owners’ remuneration and the 
R&D investments, the board’s capacity to take 
decisions in a context characterized by time-based 
competition and so on. These good practices are 
sometimes officialised, as the model for stakeholder 
engagement (IFC, 2007). 
Convergence in function or de facto refers to 
corporate behaviours and consists in the replication 
of the same corporate practices abstract from 
corporate governance systems’ characteristics. 
Specifically, the search for competitive advantage in 
global markets leads companies to emulate 
successful competitors, with the aim of attracting 
the best financial and human resources in a context 
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characterized by a lack of the same. This situation 
gives rise to hybrid behavioural responses that are 
in part driven by the institutional pressures and 
partly by the result of free strategic choices for the 
satisfaction of different stakeholders’ categories. 
The two dimensions of convergence influence 
each other: de jure convergence tends to make some 
companies’ behaviours uniform stimulating de facto 
convergence; de facto convergence can stimulate de 
jure one when, for example, legislative void or gap 
exists and companies autonomously adopt existing 
best practices to deal with competitive pressure 
(Gilson, 2004). 
In our opinion the corporate approach towards 
CSR and sustainability matters is a factor that favors 
first of all de facto convergence and consequently 
that can be a driver for de jure convergence. 
According with Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009) 
'If there is divergence in the socially accepted 
objectives of the firms across countries, it is entirely 
possible that the ideal corporate governance 
structure may also be different across countries'. 
Similarly, if companies are led by the same 
objectives of sustainable value creation in the long-
term, a gradual convergence in corporate governance 
structure that is independent from the corporate 
ownership characteristics cannot be excluded. 
An intense debate about the strengths and 
weaknesses of insider and outsider systems has 
characterized the studies about convergence, 
wondering which system could be the best. It is 
important to underline that the corporate 
governance systems derive from financial markets’ 
characteristics and ownership structure. These 
factors are scarcely changeable in the short term, 
although globalization of markets and information.  
Actually corporate governance systems are the 
results of cumulative processes, which create 
regulatory and cultural substratum, influencing 
contingent attempts of adaptation to different 
models (the so-called path dependence) (North, 
1990; Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). Hence, it is not 
possible that the better corporate governance 
practices are implemented in each environment with 
the predicted results (Puchniak, 2007). Indeed, 
countries seem to be characterized by situation of 
multiple optima in which the corporate governance 
best practices are accepted and executed respecting 
the existing bounds (Khanna et al., 2006). 
In this context, the emerging factor of 
convergence can be the fair implementation of 
responsibility and commitment principles. 
Irrespective of prevailing characteristics of national 
stock markets, corporate ownership structures and 
existing governance systems, the adoption of 
sustainability and the broader concept of social 
responsibility establish convergence and 
comparability of governance and related companies’ 
performance. 
 
4. THE ANALYSIS 
 
To go in depth the previous considerations we done 
a qualitative analysis on companies those 
governance is worldwide identified as strong 
oriented to sustainability. We first compared them in 
terms of corporate governance ownership and 
structure and then we searched for their sustainable 
commitment and engagement for long-term value 
creation for stakeholders’ interests.  
Companies analyzed are extracted by the 
Global100 Index, which collects the most sustainable 
corporations all over the world on the base of a 
cluster of variables referred to different aspects of 
corporate global responsibility 
(www.corporateknights.com). The analysis concerns 
companies included in the Index for five consecutive 
years (from 2011 to 2015) because of, in our 
opinion, this time space reflects a continuous 
commitment in CSR matters. Companies that respect 
this criterion are twenty (eleven belonging to insider 
systems and nine belonging to outsider corporate 
governance systems). 
The following Tables show the companies 
‘major shareholders high lightening the level of 
ownership’s concentration or dispersion. 
As we can see, in insider systems (Table 1) the 
market capitalization is included between around 2 
billion dollars and around 154 billion dollars; five 
companies have a capitalization under 10 billion 
dollars and the average market cap is about 32 
billion dollars. In outsider systems the market 
capitalization is between 14 and 134 billion dollars; 
the average level of market cap is about 44 billion 
dollars and this difference with insider systems can 
be explained by the greater development of financial 
markets. The analysis on these data and the 
important gap between the smallest and the biggest 
companies let us to say that the sustainability 
approach is not a prerogative only for big 
corporations.   
The development of financial markets and 
cultural factors are the causes of the ownership 
characteristics. Table 1 highlights a relevant role of 
founder families which hold shares' percentage from 
14% (Bollorè in Vivendi) to 40% and more: Kwek 
Family in City Developments (37.40%); Persson 
Family in H&M (37.69%); Cunha Seabra, Leal and 
Passos Families in Natura Cosmeticos (49.49%).   
A common characteristic to founder families is 
that family's members often hold top management 
positions: families' members are present in 
administrative (City Developments, H&M, Natura 
Cosmeticos) or in control (Vivendi) corporate 
governance bodies (Colarossi et al., 2008). This can 
entail two consequences (Giovannini, 2010): the 
easier alignment of family and business interests; 
the risk that family members, holding the top 
positions, should exclude more capable and talented 
outsiders. Regarding this last issue, some Authors 
consider the engagement of family members as a 
positive situation for company's success because of 
their service attitude (Devis et al., 1997) and their 
role for the creation of a shared corporate culture 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
This situation confirms that the founder 
families' engagement in CSR can be coherent with 
the value creation for relevant stakeholder in 
addition to the families themselves. So, taking City 
Developments (a company in Singapore) as example, 
we are not completely in agreement with hypotesys 
that, in Asian countries in particular,  managers tied 
to the founding families tend to adopt policies that 
benefit the families at the expense of other 
stakeholders (Claessen et al., 2000; Chang, 2003; Oh 
et al., 2011).  
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Differently from the insider systems, the major 
shareholders in outsider systems (Table 2) don't 
exceed the 13% of shares and they are exclusively 
represented by large funds and investment 
companies (Table 2). There are not companies 
owned by families, but big corporations with 
sprinkled capital prevail. 
 
Table 1. Market capitalization and major shareholders: companies belonging to insider systems 
 
Company Market Cap 
(Bil USD)* 
Major shareholders (shares ≥3%) §  
Adidas 19.7 
Fidelity Management & Research Co.  
Capital Research & Management Co.  
Southeastern Asset Management, Inc.  
Adidas AG  








City Developments 4.5 
Kwek Family 




Stefan Persson and family 






Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 
Nordea Bank Finland Plc 
K-retailers´ Association 
Vähittäiskaupan Takaus Oy 






Koninklijke Philip electronics 23.6 
Dodge & Cox 
Southeastern Asset Management, Inc. 
3.31% 
3.25% 
Natura Cosmeticos 3.6 
Antonio Luiz da Cunha Seabra 
Leal Family 
Estate of Anizio E Pinotti 
Lazard Asset Management LLC 
First State Investment Management (UK) Ltd. 









Neste Oil 7.7 Government of Finland 50.10% 
Novo Nordisk 153.9 
Novo Nordisk Fonden 










Franklin Mutual Advisers LLC 
Nordea Investment Management AB (Norway) 







Caisse Des Dépôts & Consignations 




* http://www.morningstar.com/. Data extracted on 15/12/15. 
§ http://www.4-traders.com/; http://investors.morningstar.com/ownership. Data extracted on 15/12/15. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show that the large and 
institutional investors (governments, banks, 
insurance companies, mutual funds etc.) have a 
significant percentage of equity. According to some 
Authors (Teoh and Shiu, 1990; Sethi, 2005; Ho et al., 
2011) the situation of the companies analysed 
suggests that the effect of institutional ownership 
on CSR is positive. In fact, institutional investors 
offer services characterized by significant 
information asymmetry in front of their clients 
(Siegel and Vitaliano, 2007): investing in socially 
responsible businesses and sustaining companies’ 
CSR is the first way by which the institutional 
investor can signal to potential clients its 
engagement in CSR and so, it can differentiate its 
services from the competitors’ ones. Furthermore, 
the institutional investors, having a significant 
percentage of equity, are often unable to easy divest 
their share without significantly lowering the stock 
price (Ho et al., 2011). So, this situation tends to 
induce a long-term engagement in business 
favouring the overtaking of a short-term vision. A 
study by Eccles et al. (2011) confirms that 
sustainable organizations attract long-term rather 
than transient investors. 
In conclusion we can affirm that owner families 
and institutional investors, although with different 
reasons, when possess a significant percentage of 
share tend to give to decision-making processes a 
long-term sustainable approach in favour of ample 
stakeholders’ categories. This situation represents a 
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Table 2. Market capitalization and major shareholders: companies belonging to outsider systems 
 
Company Market Cap (Bil USD)* Major shareholders (shares ≥3%) §  
Agilent Technologies 13.9 
T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc  
Fidelity Management & Research Co 
The Vanguard Group, Inc.  
BlackRock Fund Advisors  
SSgA Funds Management, Inc.  
Wellington Management Co. LLP  








BG Group 49.0 
BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Ltd.   
Norges Bank    





Schroder Investment Management Ltd.  
Newton Investment Management Ltd.  
Invesco Asset Management Ltd.  






Kayne Anderson Capital Advisors LP  
Enbridge Energy Partners LP  
Energy Income Partners LLC  
Royal Bank Of Canada  
Capital World Investors  
Advisory Research, Inc.  
Salient Capital Advisors LLC  
Eagle Global Advisors LLC  
Caisse De Depot Et Placement Du Quebec  
Neuberger Berman LLC  













The Vanguard Group, Inc.  
BlackRock Fund Advisors  
SSgA Funds Management, Inc  
Invesco Advisers, Inc.  
APG Asset Management US, Inc.  







Sun Life Financial 19.1 
Royal Bank Of Canada  
TD Asset Management, Inc  




Suncor Energy 37.3 
Royal Bank Of Canada  
Capital Research & Management Co. RBC  




Unilever 133.1 - 0.00% 
Westpac Banking 77.4 - 0.00% 
* http://www.morningstar.com/. Data extracted on 15/12/15. 
§ http://www.4-traders.com/; http://investors.morningstar.com/ownership. Data extracted on 15/12/15. 
 
The following Figures show the length of top 
managers’ presence in corporate governance bodies: 
the reconfirmation of mandate expresses the 
satisfaction, which extends in a medium-long term 
period, by shareholders for company’s 
performances. We have considered the first year of 
nomination in the present role for each board 
member; the time intervals are ten years long from 
2015 back (2015-2005; 2004-1995; ante 1995) as to 
include at least two mandates in insider systems 
(characterized by longer expire term than the annual 
one typical of outsider systems).  




In insider systems companies, in average, 
executive directors represent the 38.19% on total 
board members, while non-executive (NED) and non-
executive independent directors represent the 
61.81%. Figures 1 and 2 show that the majority of 
board members has been elected for the first time in 
the last ten years, but there is also a significant 










NED/Independent directors  
2005-2015 1995-2004  ante 1995 n.a.
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particular, we can notice a 7.27% of executive 
directors nominated for the first time twenty or 
more years ago (a member of founder family is 
executive director in City Development from 1969). 
Generally, the older members are part of founder 
families and this situation explains their role as 
executive directors.  
 





In outsider systems companies the 25.00% on 
total board members is represented by executive 
directors, while the 75.00% by non-executive and 
non-executive independent directors. Many dates 
about the first engagement as executive directors 
are not available and this circumstance limits our 
considerations. In any case, we can notice, as in 
insider systems companies, a large presence of 
directors appointed in the last ten years while the 
situation changes with reference to directors 
nominated in the period 1995-2004. In fact, looking 
at 1995-2004 first designation, in insider systems 
there is a similar percentage of executive and 
NED/independent members, whereas in outsider 
systems companies the percentage of 
NED/independent is about three times higher than 
the executive directors’ percentage. We can interpret 
these data as an additional form of control on 
executive members’ activity: the stable presence of 
non-executive and independent directors guarantees 
the continuity of corporate choices, even if 
executives’ turnover. The presence of executive 
directors appointed more than twenty years ago is 
very limited (3.57%), according to the outsider 
systems financial markets’ characteristics and the 
consequent fragmented ownership.   
In conclusion, we can affirm that in spite of the 
typical differences in corporate governance, due to 
the historical, cultural and economic characteristics 
of insider and outsider systems, the sustainable 
companies show something in common as the 
presence of stable investors and a long-term part of 
board members. 
After the analysis about the corporate 
governance differences of companies observed, we 
wanted to have a confirmation on their engagement 
in long-term value creation analysing the companies’ 
information available on their websites (visions, 
missions, corporate governance reports, 
sustainability reports, integrated reports, etc.).  In 
fact, the long-term perspective means that the 
ultimate goal of an organization is the sustainability 
(Schaefer, 2004; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Mostovicz 
et al., 2009) with impacts on corporate objectives 
and strategies. 
Both for insider and outsider corporate 
governance systems, all the companies declare a 
long-term business orientation; this refers to the 
crossing of divergence in time orientation about 
economic results that traditionally have 
characterized insider (oriented to long-term) from 
outsider systems (oriented to short-term).  The aim 
of these companies is to create value satisfying 
equally ample stakeholders groups. Furthermore, 
these companies emphasize the systematic 
commitment of the board in sustainability goals, 
believing that a sustainability-oriented board can be 
the fulcrum to ensure the CSR matters are integrated 
into corporate objectives and business operations.  
Although the limits of our research – connected 
to the unavailability of some data and the awareness 
that the announcement declared by companies could 
not correspond with the effective companies’ 
(irresponsible) behaviours – we think that the change 
in business orientation towards sustainability 
should produce corporate conducts, inspired by the 
long-term value creation, that are not substantially 
affected by the rules characterizing different 
countries. This situation tends to stimulate a 
functional convergence worldwide. 
 
5. EMERGING ISSUES 
 
The diffusion of the principles of sustainability and 
a broader concept of responsibility have, 
undoubtedly, promoted a review of the relevant 
companies’ performances, creating significant 
preconditions of operational convergence between 
insider and outsider corporate governance systems. 
In fact, in successful companies, corporate 
governance is characterized by a widening scope of 
the goals, having to take an interest in the entire 
network of internal and external relations, according 
to an approach based on the exchange of 
information and the optimisation of behaviour in 
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Regardless of the nature of stock markets and 
the concentration of ownership, socially responsible 
companies have therefore amended their strategic 
guidance, giving importance to the creation of 
sustainable value as a condition for growth and 
development in the medium-long term.    
Historical, cultural and economic differences 
between insider and outsider systems exist and 
companies we have analysed reflect these 
differences in term of ownership structure, 
according to the stock markets’ characteristics. 
Nevertheless, the same companies give us the 
confirmation that their sustainability approach is 
based on long-term business orientation in both 
insider and outsider systems. Furthermore, this 
approach seems to be sustained by shareholders 
(founder families or large investors) more interested 
to the long-term development of companies’ 
business and value creation than to their short-term 
profits. This means that the major factor of 
divergence between insider and outsider corporate 
governance systems attenuates, because of the 
different time orientation in the results statement, 
conditioning objectives, strategies and operational 
activities. 
We should, however, consider that globalisation 
– together with the gradual reduction of differences 
between spatial differences, cultures, information 
systems, traditions and institutions - tends to 
require greater uniformity in the corporate 
governance approaches worldwide. In addition, the 
lowering of barriers among markets and the capitals’ 
flow has increased the alternatives for investors and 
the belief that the orientation to value creation in 
the long-run may be a significant factor in reducing 
investment risk. 
An area of increasing importance for corporate 
governance, closely related to corporate strategy, is 
the oversight of company’s risk management. 
Regardless of the existing corporate governance 
structure, the change in business orientation 
towards sustainability virtually shifts every 
corporate governance system to excellence, ensuring 
greater stability of the board members and 
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